




**UCL**

## **Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) Evaluation**

**Sarah Czarnomski  
Ben Marshall  
Lucía Summers**

UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science  
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**Contact**  
Lucía Summers  
2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, Brook House  
2-16 Torrington Place  
London WC1E 7HN  
t. 020 7679 0826  
e. [l.summers@ucl.ac.uk](mailto:l.summers@ucl.ac.uk)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .....	iii
Acronyms .....	iv
Executive Summary .....	v
1 Introduction .....	1
2 Background.....	2
2.1 Violent Crime in the UK.....	2
2.2 The Night Time Economy.....	3
2.3 Alcohol and Violent Crime.....	4
2.4 Domestic Violence and Alcohol.....	4
2.5 AMEC, TVCP and DVEC .....	5
2.6 Summary .....	10
3 METHODOLOGY.....	11
3.1 Outcome Assessment.....	11
3.2 Process Assessment.....	13
4 Outcome assessment .....	16
4.1 Effect of TVCP on Police Recorded Crime Rates.....	16
4.2 Perceptions of Effectiveness.....	19
4.3 Summary .....	19
5 Process Assessment .....	20
5.1 Management.....	20
5.2 Dissemination of Good Practice.....	20
5.3 Media/Marketing.....	21
5.4 Meetings .....	22

5.5	Funding and Bids .....	22
5.6	Timetables and Data Returns .....	23
5.7	Moving Forward.....	24
5.8	Conclusion.....	24
6	Discussion.....	25
	References.....	27
	APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL ANALYSES .....	30
	APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (OPERATIONAL) .....	39
	APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (STRATEGIC) .....	41

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## ACRONYMS

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AMEC	Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit (same as OCU, see below)
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DVEC	Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaign
JDI	Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standard
OCU	Operational Command Unit (same as BCU, see above)
ODPM	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PMDU	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PSU	Police Standards Unit
SDVC	Specialist Domestic Violence Court
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
TVCP	Tackling Violent Crime Programme
UCL	University College London
VCU	Violent Crime Unit

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) is a Home Office initiative aimed at reducing national levels of serious violent crime by working intensively with 32 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) across England and Wales that have high rates of serious violent crime. The programme provides these CDRPs with support and resources with which to implement local initiatives aimed at reducing alcohol related and domestic violence specifically.

To gauge the efficacy of the TVCP, the UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science was commissioned by the Home Office Police Standards Unit (PSU) to evaluate the initiative. The evaluation sought to establish the extent to which the project met its stated goals, and includes components on outcome and process assessment.<sup>1</sup> This document, the TVCP Evaluation Report, draws on police recorded crime data and interviews with TVCP staff to determine the extent of the programme's effectiveness.

Although the TVCP was limited to a small number of CDRPs, initiatives to reduce violent crime are ongoing across the country. The findings presented here should help to direct and inform action in these areas to help reduce violent crime on a national scale.

Principal findings are as follows:

- although a 'causal' link between alcohol and violence is difficult to establish, the available literature suggests that the two are strongly associated – research has found that violence clusters in and around licensed establishments (implicating the 'night time economy' in alcohol related violence) and also that a high proportion of violent offenders are intoxicated at the time of the offence (e.g. for domestic violence incidents);
- there is therefore an evidence based rationale for the TVCP, which aims to reduce levels of serious violent crime by addressing alcohol related crime and disorder issues and domestic violence;

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<sup>1</sup> A best practice guide in relation to the TVCP is also available as a separate publication.

- from November 2004 (tranche 1 start point) to June 2006, serious violent crime in tranche 1 areas has decreased 6.7% as compared to an increase of 4.4% in non-TVCP areas over the same time period. From May 2005 (tranche 2 start point) to June 2006, Tranche 2 areas experienced a reduction of 6.9%, as compared to a reduction of only 2.0% in non-TVCP areas. From April 2006 (tranche 3 start point) to June 2006, tranche 3 areas had a 5.5% reduction in serious violent crime, as compared to an increase of 3.1% in non-TVCP areas;
- existing upwards trends in the levels of serious, less serious, and sexual violence in tranche 1 areas have been halted in the last two years, since they joined the programme. However it should be noted that these reductions might be the result of other initiatives in addition to the TVCP;
- in tranche 2 areas, serious violent crime has decreased gradually over the time they have been involved in the programme, whilst less serious and sexual violence rates have remained fairly stable;
- it is not possible to identify statistically significant results from the TVCP. This can be attributed to a number of methodological factors, including variable data recording practices in relation to the timing and intensity of the initiatives introduced as part of, and external to, the programme, in both TVCP and non-TVCP areas;
- the majority of the TVCP field workers and Single Point of Contact (SPOC) staff interviewed felt the programme had had a positive impact on CDRPs, through the provision of additional financial support (which allows CDRPs to be more innovative), better direction and focus, as well as being the catalyst for improving relationships and communication between partners;
- other aspects of the TVCP which are seen as particularly effective include:
  - the introduction of the TVCP field workers, which has ensured SPOCs are appropriately supported;
  - the dissemination of good practice, which is seen as a source of both useful information and encouragement;

- the use of media and marketing to promote local initiatives; and
- the introduction of regional (as opposed to London-based) meetings, which are more focused and accessible.
- some aspects of the TVCP that could be improved include:
  - the funding application procedures – it would be helpful to announce all upcoming funding opportunities so that CDRPs can carefully plan for the year, or even pull the funds for the TVCP and the Alcohol Misuse and Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaigns (AMEC and DVEC, respectively) into the same pool, so that the bidding process can be simplified (although some field workers believe this alternative may reduce accountability);
  - the late receipt of allocated funding; and
  - the dissemination of good practice to non-TVCP areas (although this will be addressed, at least to some extent, by the publication of the “TVCP Good Practice Guide” by the end of 2006).

All in all, the TVCP seems to have been successful. Although statistically significant effects could not be detected, this is not surprising, considering the various methodological shortcomings encountered. Anecdotal evidence together with reductions in serious violent crime over the last few years provide reassurance of the programme’s effectiveness. In addition to this, those involved have described how the TVCP has allowed CDRPs to take a more innovative, focused and multi-agency approach to reducing violent crime, which can only lead to more effective crime reduction in future.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

1. The Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) is a Home Office initiative aimed at reducing national levels of serious violent crime by working intensively with those 32 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) across England and Wales that have high rates of serious violent crime (these account for 8.6% of all the CDRPs in England and Wales (N=373)). The programme was introduced in three separate tranches – November 2004, May 2005 and April 2006 – and provides support and resources with which to implement local initiatives specifically aimed at reducing alcohol related and domestic violence.
2. To gauge the efficacy of the TVCP, the UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science (JDI) was commissioned by the Home Office Police Standards Unit (PSU) to evaluate the initiative. The evaluation sought to establish the extent to which the project met its stated goals, and includes components on both outcome and process assessment.
3. Although the TVCP was limited to a small number of CDRPs, initiatives to reduce violent crime are ongoing across the country. The findings presented here supplement the lessons learned through the Alcohol Misuse and Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaigns (AMEC and DVEC, respectively) and should help to direct and inform action to reduce violent crime on a national scale.
4. The report begins with a discussion of the context within which the TVCP developed, looking at patterns of violent crime across England and Wales and reviewing recent and current programmes aimed at tackling them. Section 3 describes the methodology of the evaluation from both a quantitative and qualitative perspective. Sections 4 and 5 present the findings from the outcome and process analyses respectively, and Section 6 summarises and concludes the report.

## 2 BACKGROUND

5. Tackling violent crime, especially alcohol related violent crime, is a complex issue. This section aims to give some background into the nature of the problem, and how the government has attempted to solve it. The first part discusses the current statistics on violent crime in the UK. This is followed by a look at the relationship between alcohol and violent crime specifically in relation to both the night time economy and domestic violence. Lastly, previous and ongoing campaigns to reduce alcohol related and domestic violence are discussed.

### ***2.1 Violent Crime in the UK***

6. The British Crime Survey (BCS) offers a more reliable picture of violent crime in England and Wales than police recorded crime figures. This is in part because of changes in reporting, recording and police activity – including the change to National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in April 2002 – but also because less serious offences (see e.g. Mattinson, 2001) and incidents that happen between those within an intimate relationship – such as domestic violence – are not always reported to the police.
7. The 2005/06 BCS (see Walker, Kershaw & Nicholas, 2006) describes the following violent crime picture for England and Wales:
  - 2,420,000 violent crime incidents, falling 43% since 1995;
  - 547,000 incidents of wounding, falling 40% since 1995;
  - 1,490,000 common assaults, falling 49% since 1995;
  - the risk of being a victim of violent crime was 3.4%; and
  - young men, aged 16 to 24, were most at risk, with 12.6% becoming a victim of violent crime in the year prior to interview.

8. Due to small numbers, separate figures for serious wounding cannot be reliably provided by the BCS. However, crime statistics suggest that more serious violence against the person accounts for 3% of all police recorded violent crime, compared to 84% for less serious offences (the remainder comprising sexual offences and robbery; see Walker et al, 2006).
9. According to Coleman, Hird and Povey (2006), violent incidents are more likely to occur at the weekend (51% of all incidents). There is also a tendency for violent crime to occur at night (64%; excluding mugging and acquaintance violence). This comprises what has been termed violence associated with the night time economy, to which we now turn.

## ***2.2 The Night Time Economy***

10. The night time economy does not have a formal definition but is usually associated with the pubs, clubs and bars that are clustered together in the centre of a town or city (Finney, 2004; Allen et al, 2003). It also includes the 'feeder' businesses that customers enjoy on their night out, such as taxis, fast food outlets, off licences and late night newsagents.
11. The night time economy is expanding across the UK, with high levels of investment in city centre development. However, with the night time economy comes a culture of heavy, sometimes binge drinking, with alcohol intoxication having become the fundamental ingredient to having a good night out (Tierney & Hobbs, 2003).
12. The Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS, 2004) report that, as of 30 June 2004, there were 113,000 on-licensed premises (i.e. pubs, clubs, restaurants) in the UK, an increase of 5% from 12 years earlier. While the increase may seem small, it is a reflection of an increasing trend in the number of licensed premises.
13. While the demonstration of a causal link between alcohol, the night time economy and violence is problematic due to a number of methodological and ethical issues, many authors, including the Strategy Unit Alcohol Harm Reduction project (PMSU, 2004a, 2004b), suggest an association between alcohol and violence, including at the more serious end, violence causing injury and being a factor in domestic violence and

sexual assault. The research findings supporting this association are explored in more detail next.

### **2.3 Alcohol and Violent Crime**

14. According to the 2005/06 BCS (Walker et al, 2006), offenders were thought to be under the influence of alcohol in 44% of all violent incidents. This differed depending on the relationship between the offender and the victim, with stranger incidents having higher reported numbers of alcohol use than acquaintance incidents.
15. Research by Budd (2003) supports these claims with evidence from the British Crime Surveys going back to 1982. Budd found that 80% of violent crimes in or around pubs, bars and clubs involved people thought to be under the influence of alcohol, while 38% of 'under the influence' violent crimes had taken place in or around pubs, bars or clubs. In addition, one-fifth of all violent crimes had taken place in or around pubs, bars and clubs.
16. These findings are further substantiated by the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey, from which it appears that young male binge drinkers are more than twice as likely to commit a violent offence (16%) than young male regular drinkers (7%; Matthews & Richardson, 2005).
17. Alcohol related crime in England and Wales is estimated to cost the economy up to £7.3 billion (PMSU, 2004b).

### **2.4 Domestic Violence and Alcohol**

18. Statistics from the 2005/06 BCS (Walker et al, 2006) show that:
  - 15% of all violent crimes were classified as domestic (31% of crimes against women and 5% of crimes against men – 80% of victims of domestic violence were women);

- of all violent incidents, domestic violence has the highest repeat victimisation level, with 43% of victims being victimised more than once, and 23% three or more times; and
  - domestic violence offenders were thought to be under the influence of alcohol in 46% of cases.
19. Similarly, a study by Gilchrist et al (2003), which focused on 336 male domestic violence offenders, showed a history of alcohol abuse in 49% of the sample. The authors claimed that alcohol dependence was prevalent within the sample and that this dependency should be considered as a target for intervention. The authors further argued that alcohol may be a distinguishing factor in domestic violence offenders and that problematic alcohol use may limit the effectiveness of intervention programmes.
20. Because of its high degree of concentration in space and time, violence associated with the night time economy was seen as open to intervention (Tierney & Hobbs, 2003). In 2004, on the back of the Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England, a number of initiatives began to be implemented through the Police Standards Unit (PSU) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). These include the Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign (AMEC), the Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaign (DVEC) and the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP), all described in detail in the following section.

## ***2.5 AMEC, TVCP and DVEC***

### **AMEC**

21. The Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaigns (AMECs) were designed to raise awareness of the importance of responsible management and consumption of alcohol, as well as tackling the offences themselves (DCMS, Home Office & ODPM, 2005).

22. AMECs aim to target alcohol related crime and disorder by funding short-term projects at the Basic Command Unit (BCU) level.<sup>2</sup> The funding originates from the PSU and is allocated to projects that are mainly police driven in nature (e.g. officer overtime or test purchase operations), although there are some elements of multi-agency working (e.g. structured multi-agency visits to licensed premises and publicity campaigns).
23. There have been four national AMEC campaigns so far, three of which cover the TVCP period:
- AMEC 1: 1 July – 31 August 2004
  - AMEC 2: 18 December 2004 – 3 January 2005
  - AMEC 3: 14 November 2005 – 8 January 2006
  - AMEC 4: 8 May – 8 June 2006
24. In addition to these, there have been two other AMECs, only available to the TVCP areas. These were a summer AMEC on 17 July - 2 September 2005 and a winter AMEC on 28 January – 31 March 2006.
25. As part of the AMEC (and also the DVEC, described later), CDRPs are required to complete a problem profiles analysis, for which guidance is available. This helps CDRPs to assess their local problems, and thus respond to them, more effectively.
26. From the early AMECs, it was realised that the police could not address the problem of alcohol related violent crime alone (DCMS et al, 2005). To address this, the government introduced the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP), which takes a much more partnership-oriented approach.

## **TVCP**

27. The Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) is focused on a small number of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) which have high levels of

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<sup>2</sup> The term BCU is used throughout this section, and relates to both Basic Command Units (BCU) and Operational Command Units (OCU).

serious violent crime. For instance, the twelve Tranche 1 CDRPs, which began the programme in November 2004, comprise 3.2% of all CDRPs in England and Wales (6.2% of the population) but accounted for 14.9% of all serious violent crime in 2003/04 (see Table 1).<sup>3</sup>

28. The TVCP builds on the AMEC but also aims to reduce domestic violence (DCMS et al, 2005), as the second biggest driver after alcohol of volume violent crime. The TVCP provides funding to CDRPs to develop and implement local multi-agency strategies to target alcohol related crime and disorder and domestic violence. Local CDRPs are then required to report back on progress and share good practice with other areas.
29. The TVCP is funded annually through the Police Standards Unit (PSU) and the Violent Crime Unit (VCU) at the Home Office. The TVCP is a collaborative multi-agency programme, where partnership is strongly encouraged, and thus funding is directed to the CDRPs rather than the police.

**Table 1. Percentage of serious violent crime in TVCP and non-TVCP areas, by financial year.**

	% population	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
<b>TVCP Tranche 1</b> – Nov 2004 12 CDRPs (3.2%)	6.2	12.6	14.9	14.8	14.7
<b>TVCP Tranche 2</b> – May 2005 7 CDRPs (1.9%)	3.6	10.2	9.7	9.2	7.8
<b>TVCP Tranche 3</b> – Apr 2006 13 CDRPs (3.5%)	8.1	11.1	11.8	11.5	12.3
<b>ALL TVCP Tranches</b> 32 CDRPs (8.5%)	18.0	33.9	36.4	35.5	34.8
<b>Non TVCP</b> 341 CDRPs (91.5%)	82.0	66.1	63.6	64.5	65.2

Source: Home Office.

<sup>3</sup> In this case, serious violent crime comprises the following offences: murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, causing death by dangerous or careless driving, and wounding or other act endangering life.

30. The TVCP is spread over three tranches (see Table 2 for more details):
- tranche 1 includes 12 CDRPs and began in November 2004;
  - tranche 2 includes 7 CDRPs and began in May 2005; and
  - tranche 3 includes 13 CDRPs and began in April 2006.
31. More recently, and to emphasise the domestic violence side of the TVCP, the government has run two Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaigns (DVECs), outlined below.

## **DVEC**

32. The Domestic Violence Enforcement Campaigns (DVECs) have involved 46 BCUs nationally; including all TVCP areas, and all areas with a Specialist Domestic Violence Court (SDVC).<sup>4</sup> To date, £1.25m has been allocated to DVEC campaigns (Home Office, 2006a).
33. The aim of the DVEC is to improve response and service to victims of domestic violence. The projects delivered as part of DVEC were a development of ideas that can be found in the ACPO's (2004) *Guidance on Investigating Domestic Violence*.
34. The three main areas of focus were:
- improved investigation by 999 call takers being trained to ask the most informative questions of domestic violence victims;
  - use of dedicated police response teams including specially trained domestic violence officers and DVEC cars; and
  - targeting of repeat domestic violence offenders.

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<sup>4</sup> The delivery of the SDVC Programme is being developed by the Violent Crime Unit's Domestic Violence Team in parallel with the TVCP. This programme brings together the police, CPS, HM Court Service, Probation Service and the voluntary sector, and has developed a co-ordinated local delivery model, which complements the TVCP approach. There are currently over 50 areas included in the SDVC Programme, some of which are also in the TVCP.

**Table 2. Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) where the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) has been introduced.**

	<b>CDRP</b>	<b>Police Force</b>	<b>GO Region</b>
TRANCHE 1 (November 2004)	Brent	Met	LONDON
	Hackney	Met	LONDON
	Islington	Met	LONDON
	Lambeth	Met	LONDON
	Southwark	Met	LONDON
	Westminster	Met	LONDON
	Bolton	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Liverpool (North and South BCUs)	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Wirral	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Cardiff	S Wales	WALES
	Kingston Upon Hull	Humberside	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Wakefield	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
TRANCHE 2 (May 2005)	Nottingham	Nottinghamshire	EAST MIDS
	Manchester (North and South BCUs)	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Salford	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Coventry	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Wolverhampton	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Rhonda Cynon Taff	S Wales	WALES
	Swansea	S Wales	WALES
TRANCHE 3 (April 2006)	Leicester	Leicestershire	EAST MIDS
	Camden	Met	LONDON
	Ealing	Met	LONDON
	Haringey	Met	LONDON
	Lewisham	Met	LONDON
	Newham	Met	LONDON
	Waltham Forest	Met	LONDON
	Bristol	Avon & Somerset	SOUTH WEST
	Birmingham (D1, D3 BCUs only)	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Doncaster	S Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Sheffield Central	S Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Leeds (City & Holbeck BCU only)	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Kirklees	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER

35. There have been two DVECs run so far, both of which cover the TVCP period:
- DVEC 1: 3 February – 31 March 2006 (tranches 1, 2 and SDVC areas); and
  - DVEC World Cup: 9 June – 9 July 2006 (tranche 1, 2, 3 and SDVC areas). The FIFA World Cup DVEC campaign was based on research which shows that during big sports competitions where men gather together and drink, violence, including domestic violence, increases (e.g. Sabo, Gray & Moore, 2000).

A DVEC Lessons Learnt document has been published incorporating the learning from both campaigns (Home Office, 2006c).

## **2.6 Summary**

36. Violent crime is a problem in the UK but one that has received continuous attention and funding from the government in recent years. As of yet there are no plans to run any more AMECs or DVECs or to end the TVCP. Although it is not known yet whether these initiatives have been cost effective, important findings have already arisen in relation to the AMEC (see Erol, 2006; and Home Office, 2004, 2006b) and DVEC (Home Office, 2006c). The present study aimed to evaluate the TVCP.

### 3 METHODOLOGY

37. This evaluation consists of both an outcome and a process assessment. The outcome assessment involves the examination of police recorded violent crime in an attempt to determine whether the TVCP has had a measurable impact. The process assessment consists of a series of one-to-one interviews with individuals involved with the TVCP, which provides information on local perceptions of the programmes effectiveness as well as issues surrounding its implementation and delivery.

#### **3.1 Outcome Assessment**

38. In order to determine whether the TVCP led to a quantifiable reduction in violent crime in the targeted areas, monthly aggregated police recorded crime data for TVCP and comparison CDRPs were examined over time. Not all violent offences were included in these analyses. Instead, a number of offences were selected based on their relevance to the TVCP aims. This excludes robbery and offences involving cruelty to children. Threats to kill were also excluded since these data may not be as reliable as required.<sup>5</sup> Table 3 shows the offences that were included in our analyses. Sex offences have been included but are analysed separately from the other sets of data. This is because, although sexual violence could be alcohol related and/or be classified as a domestic incident, sex offences were not the focus of TVCP.
39. Recorded crime data prior to April 2002 were not included as they were deemed non-comparable due to the introduction of new counting rules in April 2002.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> New guidance issued in 2005 is likely to have led to a reduction in the number of recorded offences for this crime category.

<sup>6</sup> There is some suggestion that the successful implementation of these new counting rules took some time to be achieved in a number of areas, which may also affect the data.


**Table 3. Offences included under the categories of serious and less serious violence.**

<b>Serious Violence</b>	<b>Less Serious violence</b>
Murder	Other wounding
Manslaughter	Harassment
Attempted murder	Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding
Causing death by dangerous or careless driving	Racially or religiously aggravated harassment
Wounding or other act endangering life	Assault on a constable
	Common assault
	Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

40. As can be seen in Figure 1, one or two crimes comprise the majority of both 'serious' and 'other' violence. This is especially the case for serious violence where 90% of all crime are 'serious wounding' offences. For less serious violence, 'other wounding', 'harassment', and 'common assault' make up 94% of the crime recorded. The implication of this is that analyses performed on aggregate data (i.e. either serious or less serious violence as a whole) will be heavily affected by these more prevalent crime types.
41. Additional analyses were performed where tranches 1 and 2 were compared with a series of matched CDRPs before and after the introduction of the TVCP.<sup>7</sup> The methodological aspects of this part of the study, as well as the findings, are presented in Appendix A.

<sup>7</sup> Tranche 3 could not be examined due to the recent implementation of the TVCP (i.e. April 2006) and the resulting likelihood that any potential effects could not be reliably detected at this early stage.

**Figure 1: Breakdown of serious and less serious violent crime for England and Wales April 2002 to June 2006.**



Source: Home Office.

### 3.2 Process Assessment

42. For this part of the evaluation, one-to-one telephone interviews were conducted with TVCP fieldworkers and TVCP Single Point of Contact staff (SPOCs). These aimed to gather information on the perceptions of effectiveness amongst those involved with the programme at ground level, and issues surrounding the process of programme implementation and delivery.

43. A total of seven Government Offices, 11 Police Forces and 32 CDRPs are involved in the TVCP. The interviews in the present study were limited to SPOCs for tranches 1 and 2 since it was felt that tranche 3 TVCP areas, which only began in April 2006, would not yet be at an advanced enough stage to be able to answer the questions fully. Out of the 19 SPOCs in tranches 1 and 2, 14 were available for interview (73.7%; see Table 4 below). The four field workers with responsibility for all TVCP areas in tranches 1 and 2 were also interviewed as part of this study.
44. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted for thirty to forty minutes. Interviews were digitally recorded and the data analysed using content analysis (i.e. identification of the main themes which are then illustrated with quotes). The topics discussed in the interviews included perceptions of effectiveness, facilitating factors and barriers to effectiveness (for interview schedules, see appendices B and C). The interviews also aimed to find out more about the local initiatives being implemented and the steps that had been taken to address alcohol related and domestic violence specifically.

**Table 4. TVCP areas where Single Point of Contact (SPOC) staff were interviewed.**

	<b>CDRP</b>	<b>Police Force</b>	<b>GO Region</b>
TRANCHE 1 (November 2004)	Brent	Met	LONDON
	Southwark	Met	LONDON
	Westminster	Met	LONDON
	Bolton	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Liverpool	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Wirral	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Cardiff	S Wales	WALES
	Wakefield	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
TRANCHE 2 (May 2005)	Nottingham	Nottinghamshire	EAST MIDS
	Salford	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Coventry	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Wolverhampton	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Rhonda Cynon Taff	S Wales	WALES
	Swansea	S Wales	WALES

45. In the following sections, the main findings from the evaluation of the TVCP will be presented. First of all, violent crime rates are examined to statistically measure the effect of the TVCP in tranches 1 and 2. This was done in an attempt to evaluate the *outcome* of the TVCP. After this, the *process* of the TVCP is evaluated by reporting findings from interviews with TVCP Leads, Single Points of Contact and Fieldworkers from tranches 1 and 2.

## 4 OUTCOME ASSESSMENT

46. This section aims to assess the effectiveness of the TVCP in terms of any effect its introduction may have had on police recorded crime rates, and, on a more subjective level, the perceptions of those involved in the programme. In relation to the former, since a key focus of the TVCP is on early intervention to prevent the escalation of violence, we would expect to see initial rises in less serious violence but, importantly, corresponding falls in the levels of more serious violence.


### ***4.1 Effect of TVCP on Police Recorded Crime Rates***

47. Figure 2 shows 12-month moving averages of serious violent crime rates for each of the three tranches as well as for the non-TVCP CDRPs/BCUs.<sup>8</sup> While serious violent crime has remained stable over time in the non-TVCP areas, trends are apparent for the three TVCP tranches. In the case of tranche 3, there has been a slight upwards trend, but it is too early to determine whether the introduction of the TVCP in April 2006 has affected this pattern. The rates in tranche 2 had already started to decrease prior to the TVCP being introduced in May 2005, and continue to decrease at the rate established at that point in time. The biggest difference noted after the TVCP was introduced was for tranche 1, where an existing upwards trend was levelled off, even becoming a downwards trend in recent months.
48. Another way to look at these trends is in terms of percentage changes. From November 2004 to June 2006, serious violent crime in tranche 1 areas has gone down 6.7% as compared to an increase of 4.4% in non-TVCP areas over the same time period. From May 2005 to June 2006, Tranche 2 areas experienced a reduction of 6.9%, as compared to a reduction of 2.0% in non-TVCP areas. From April to June 2006, tranche 3 areas had a 5.5% reduction in serious violent crime, as compared to an increase of 3.1% in non-TVCP areas.

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<sup>8</sup> Non-TVCP areas include all CDRPs/BCUs not included in either of the three TVCP tranches.


**Figure 2: Twelve-month moving averages on the number of serious violent offences per 1,000 population for the three TVCP tranche areas and non-TVCP CDRPs (the vertical bars represent the introduction of each of the three tranches in November 2004, May 2005 and April 2006).**



Source: Home Office.


49. The levels of less serious crime are, as expected, generally on the increase for all tranches and non-TVCP areas. The trends in tranches 1 and 2 seem to have been levelled off somewhat following the introduction of the TVCP.
50. As for the level of sexual violence (see Figure 4), again, the biggest difference before and after the TVCP can be observed for tranches 1 and 2, although the fact that non-TVCP areas and tranche 3 areas have also experienced improvements means we should interpret these patterns with caution.
51. Detailed analyses were performed on these figures to determine whether a statistically significant effect could be attributed to the introduction of the TVCP in these areas (see Appendix A). Although significant results were not obtained, this is likely to be due to a number of methodological shortcomings, which are discussed in more detail in the Discussion section of this report.

**Figure 3: Twelve-month moving averages on the number of less serious violent offences per 1,000 population for the three TVCP tranche areas and non-TVCP CDRPs (the vertical bars represent the introduction of each of the three tranches in November 2004, May 2005 and April 2006).**



Source: Home Office.

**Figure 4: Twelve-month moving averages on the number of sex offences per 1,000 population for the three TVCP tranche areas and non-TVCP CDRPs (the vertical bars represent the introduction of each of the three tranches in November 2004, May 2005 and April 2006).**



Source: Home Office.

## **4.2 Perceptions of Effectiveness**

52. A second aim of the present section was to determine whether local staff involved in the TVCP felt the TVCP had made an impact in their areas. This information was gathered through the interviews carried out with TVCP fieldworkers and SPOCs.
53. Overwhelmingly the response from those involved with the TVCP has been positive. Most have seen the programme as having a significant impact on violent crime rates and/or the way violent crime is dealt with.
54. The extra funding – although small in relation to overall crime reduction budgets – has allowed CDRPs to take a more innovative approach to crime prevention. At the same time, the national structure for the TVCP has provided these areas with additional direction and focus, making their choices more informed.
55. By encouraging different agencies to work together through direct partnership funding, the TVCP has also fostered improved relationships and understanding between partners. As one interviewee stated: “You can achieve more if you have a common goal and you all pull together and you believe in what you are doing.”

## **4.3 Summary**

56. Serious violent crime rates seem to be reducing both in tranches 1 and 2, as compared to tranche 3 and non-TVCP areas. However, a statistically significant effect following the introduction of the TVCP could not be detected, although this is not surprising once all factors are considered. More explanation is available at Appendix A. TVCP staff in local areas state that the programme has helped reduce violent crime by enabling them to take a more innovative, focused and multi-agency approach.

## 5 PROCESS ASSESSMENT

57. The findings presented in this section are based solely on interviews carried out with TVCP fieldworkers and SPOCs, and thus represent perceptions. In the previous section, perceptions of the TVCP's effectiveness were reported. This section focuses on the logistics and administrative aspects of the TVCP, and how some of these may be improved in future.

### ***5.1 Management***

58. TVCP Fieldworkers play an important role in the day to day running of the programme, providing a key link between the Home Office and the individual TVCP areas. They facilitate the flow of information, advise on projects, and make sure the programme is running smoothly. They also disseminate good practice to their CDRPs and assist with the networking of those CDRPs by representing them at regional meetings. Each fieldworker has responsibility for several TVCP areas. Assigning full time fieldworkers to TVCP areas began around November 2005, a year after the scheme began, prior to which their appointments were part time.
59. Fieldworkers have described their role in the TVCP as a “trouble shooter”, a “critical friend” and the “honest broker between the Home Office and the CDRPs”. If a fieldworker is unable to help one of their CDRPs immediately, they will either ‘signpost’ them to the right person or find the correct answer for them. This role often means translating strategies and ideas from the Home Office into CDRP operational language and back again.
60. Unanimously SPOCs within TVCP areas felt that support during the TVCP had been improved since the introduction of full time fieldworkers.

### ***5.2 Dissemination of Good Practice***

61. The identification and dissemination of good practice is an important part of learning in the TVCP. Staff interviewed explained how hearing about the good work their

colleagues in other areas were doing was a source of encouragement. However, one interviewee mentioned that the Home Office could have turned things around a bit quicker when it comes to good practice. As one SPOC commented, “[there are] a lot of bright people with a lot of experience and I’m sure we could have learned from each other in a more effective way”.

62. The fieldworkers felt that their CDRPs were good at disseminating information and good practice within their regional TVCP groups, and between their TVCP counterparts nationally. However, dissemination to non-TVCP areas is typically not so good. This issue will be addressed, at least to some extent, by the publication of the “TVCP Good Practice Guide” by the end of 2006.
63. There are still some issues around the upcoming good practice website, with one SPOC believing that it should have been more of a priority and, after two years of waiting, consider it a bit late in coming. Along the same vein, the good practice that is provided on the website needs to be related to projects that have been properly evaluated, according to one SPOC.

### **5.3 Media/Marketing**

64. The majority of CDRPs have had good working relationships with the local media and have used it to the best of their abilities. Others have tried, but been faced with media who are either disinterested, or would rather report on more serious crime.
65. CDRPs have marketed their messages using t-shirts, hand-outs, posters, advertising vans, taxis, and big screens in the city centre. Two CDRPs also used ‘red cards’ as part of a sporting themed marketing campaign around the time of the 2006 World Cup.
66. Getting a singular message across as a partnership was seen as important, rather than each organisation giving out their own messages. Some CDRPs have even employed media “gurus” in order to centralise their marketing.
67. Local celebrities have been used in two TVCP campaigns; however their involvement, in these two cases, was unfortunately not successful. One involved a famous boxer fronting a DV campaign, which was deemed inappropriate by the CDRP. In the other case, the local celebrity was later arrested for assault.

## **5.4 Meetings**

68. Regular meetings for TVCP staff and other relevant agencies (e.g. police, Government Office) have been in place since the outset of the TVCP. These meetings are aimed to assess progress and provide those involved with the TVCP an opportunity to discuss current issues and share good practice.
69. Originally, these meetings were held centrally (i.e. in London) and were attended by Government Office and Force Leads throughout England and Wales. More recently, these have been replaced by regional meetings and membership has extended to include all CDRP practitioners involved in the programme, which have proved popular. For those in the north and west of the UK, the meetings in London meant a lot of travel and thus a lot of time away from work. The national meetings were also getting too big for one SPOC who claimed it was too easy to become invisible and hide from being judged. Also, the lack of any kind of agenda or data being sent out prior to the meetings meant that individuals were arriving ill prepared for discussions.
70. The regional meetings centre more on partnerships, where previously the London meetings had been more police oriented. Regional meetings are considered to be more focused, and because of the smaller numbers of people, have more accountability. Many of these meetings are theme-based, which has also proved successful.

## **5.5 Funding and Bids**

71. Standard funding for the TVCP is £50k for year one, £40k for year two, and £20k for year three. However, in some cases more funds were available for CDRPs which housed more than one BCU. These extra funds are typically given to CDRPs in large cities, such as Manchester. This is indicative of the TVCP's flexibility, which shuns a 'one size fits all' approach, and instead focuses on the needs of the individual areas.
72. Funding issues raised in interviews focused not just around TVCP, but also AMEC and DVEC because of their inter-relatedness. While everyone found the money

helpful, 'funding' was the issue that came up most when discussing how TVCP could be improved.

73. One of the issues was the short notice at which the TVCP areas were told about the funds for TVCP, AMEC and DVEC. Knowing in advance of the funds available to them, and how many campaigns they would be running in the upcoming year would be beneficial in terms of strategy and planning for the year ahead.
74. A further issue was the way the funds are broken up into AMEC, DVEC and TVCP. TVCP areas have to apply separately for the three different funding streams which individually only represent a relatively small amount of money. Applying for funds was seen as 'clumsy' by one SPOC, and 'not particularly easy' by four. Two SPOCs felt that applying for one pool of money once a year (which may require a certain number of AMECs and DVECs to be run) would be more efficient, and therefore more effective. With £20k in hand it is difficult to plan for the future, however with the whole year's funds together, the planning could be better thought out.
75. Contrary to the SPOCs' position, fieldworkers see reducing the funds into smaller sums as about ensuring accountability. Accountability has vastly improved with the introduction of the six month split of funds combined with a mid-year evaluation. A favourable evaluation means that the next six months' worth of funding will be provided.
76. Lastly, many SPOCs and fieldworkers are unhappy about the late receipt of funds. Fieldworkers understand both the Home Office and CDRPs' positions on the late funding issue and often end up mediating between the two parties.

## **5.6 Timetables and Data Returns**

77. Originally, TVCP areas were required to submit monthly data returns to the Home Office. Because the specific returns of data had to be recorded separately to all other police recorded crime, TVCP areas had to specifically task someone to do it – which was a cost for them. Since May 2006, the Home Office are extracting these data from iQuanta, which has reduced the administrative responsibilities of local TVCP staff.

## **5.7 Moving Forward**

78. One SPOC commented that since alcohol related violence and domestic violence are connected, TVCP funding in the future should be solely focused on alcohol related crime, but in a more holistic sense so as to include ALL alcohol related violence rather than just violence related to the night time economy.
79. It was suggested by one SPOC that the TVCP would benefit in the future from more fieldworkers since, geographically, it is very hard for some to travel the distances between their TVCP areas.
80. There was a worry with one SPOC that TVCP will soon go out of vogue. He felt there needed to be long-term strategies and investment in the programme. It was stated that “the TVCP needs to be continued”.
81. As funding for tranche 1 TVCPs is reduced, there is a concern that this will “cut the tranche 1 areas ‘loose’ in terms of them potentially moving away from the violent crime agenda”. Since these are areas with the highest violent crime levels, they should still be involved, as they will still have very high levels of violent crime.

## **5.8 Conclusion**

82. For a programme that has been running only two years, the TVCP has had high acclaim from its practitioners. Positive comments were more the norm rather than the exception; even those who thought the programme needed improvement felt that overall the TVCP was a good thing. However, the interviewees have fairly pointed out where improvements could be made in order to make the process smoother for practitioners. The suggestions for improvement are mostly small and easily altered, and would be of substantial benefit to CDRPs.

## 6 DISCUSSION

83. Recorded violent crime rates in the TVCP areas cannot be statistically attributed solely to the introduction of the TVCP. Where notable reductions in crime were observed, these were more likely to have occurred as a result of various initiatives (available to both TVCP and non-TVCP areas), as opposed to the TVCP alone. Detailed information on initiatives other than those being part of the TVCP was not available for either the TVCP or the non-TVCP areas, and their effect could not, therefore, be controlled for.
84. Since TVCP areas are selected on the basis of high rates of serious violent crime, in most cases the problem is already receiving considerable local resources aimed at tackling the problems. In some TVCP areas, programmes have been on-going for several years and the processes and partnerships involved are now fairly well established. It is therefore not surprising that a before and after TVCP comparison did not yield a significant difference, bearing in mind that: a) work of the nature encouraged by the TVCP may have already started prior to its formal introduction; and b) the TVCP-funded initiatives represent in many cases a small proportion of the work being done in these areas (TVCP provides a relatively small amount of funds in comparison to local crime reduction budgets).
85. The fact that overall violent crime figures were analysed also means that any effects of the TVCP would be underestimated. This is because the TVCP specifically targets alcohol related and domestic violence. Although it would have been ideal to only include those incidents which were alcohol related, their quick and reliable identification was not possible (flags are not consistently used when recording crime data and coding based on free text fields is a time consuming process which fell outside the scope of this report).
86. Having said this, we had the opportunity of isolating particular incidents for three specific CDRPs, for which individual offence level data were available (see case studies in the “TVCP Good Practice Report”). However, a systematic evaluation of concrete initiatives (e.g. triage units) was not possible due to the lack of available information of the intensity, location and timing of the intervention (i.e. CDRPs held no records of how many units were in place, or indeed where and when these units were

open to the public). It is strongly recommended that this information is carefully recorded in future to enable systematic and accurate evaluations to be carried out.

87. It is important that this lack of 'significance' does not detract from the fact that some of these areas appear to have a handle on their violent crime problems and indeed it would be beneficial to investigate how these areas are achieving these reductions.
88. One of the most remarkable aspects of the TVCP has been the increased partnership working within the CDRPs. While many partnerships worked well before the programme, the joint funding and joint focus of the TVCP has improved partnerships by requiring people to work together. From these partnerships, new working relationships have been formed, as well as a better understanding of the roles of different agencies in tackling violent crime.
89. The part of the TVCP with which CDRPs had the most problems was the funding and bidding process. Earlier warning of funds, projected timetables for the running of AMECs and DVEC's, will help smooth the process.
90. All in all, the programme appears to be beneficial, despite its effect on overall violent crime rates not achieving statistical significance. The outcome assessment performed and presented here was limited by a number of methodological factors, some of which result from variable data recording practices on the timing, intensity and exact location of the initiatives being implemented. Unless these issues are addressed, a systematic evaluation of the TVCP and the initiatives implemented under its umbrella will not be possible. Anecdotal evidence and staff perceptions indicate, however, the programme has had an impact on local crime. In addition to this, the TVCP has been successful in promoting relationships and communication between different agencies, which should lead to more efficient work being carried out in future and thus significant reductions in violent crime.

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## APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL ANALYSES

This section reports on a series of more detailed statistical analyses performed on police recorded violent crime data. These data were tested for differences before and after the introduction of the TVCP as compared to a series of matched non-TVCP areas. In the following paragraphs, the procedure for selecting these comparators is presented. This is followed by an explanation of the statistical analyses performed on these data, which mainly consisted of time series analyses.

### Selection of Comparator Areas

The non-TVCP areas were selected by matching each TVCP area with one of its top 14 'most similar' areas for 2006/07 as determined by the Home Office. Which of the 14 'most similar' areas selected was based on its similarity to the TVCP area in terms of its serious violent crime rate in 2003/04 (for tranche 1 TVCP areas) and 2004/05 (for tranche 2 TVCP areas). Most similar areas which were tranche 1 or tranche 2 TVCP areas themselves were excluded. However, in cases where a suitable match could not be found among non-TVCP areas, tranche 3 CDRPs were used as comparison areas. This is not expected to have affected the results, since the data examined covered the period April 2002 to June 2006, and the TVCP in tranche 3 was introduced in April 2006. Indeed, the very fact that the area had been selected as a TVCP area meant that it had similar violent crime problems and was thus a very suitable control (see Table 5 for a list of matched areas).<sup>9</sup>

Although matching was done carefully, not all factors could be considered and thus the matched areas are still expected to differ significantly, which could affect the results.

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<sup>9</sup> In this case, serious violent crime comprises the following offences: murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, causing death by dangerous or careless driving, and wounding or other act endangering life.

**Table 5. Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) where the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) has been introduced and matched non-TVCP CDRPs.**

	CDRP	Matching non-TVCP CDRP
TRANCHE 1 (November 2004)	Brent	Ealing
	Hackney	Newham
	Islington	Lewisham
	Lambeth	Camden
	Southwark	Haringey
	Westminster	Tower Hamlets
	Bolton	Tameside
	Liverpool	Middlesbrough
	Wirral	St Helens
	Cardiff	Northampton
	Kingston Upon Hull	Birmingham
	Wakefield	Stockton-on-Tees
	TRANCHE 2 (May 2005)	Nottingham
Manchester		Leicester
Salford		Preston
Coventry		Sheffield
Wolverhampton		Sandwell
Rhonda Cynon Taff		Newport County
Swansea		Peterborough


### Time Series Analyses

Using a set of time series ARIMA (1,1,0) models, it was possible to estimate what the violent crime rates may have been in the TVCP areas had the TVCP not been introduced. These estimations are based on monthly aggregate crime rates prior to the introduction of the TVCP and take into account any general trends.<sup>10</sup>

For instance, Figure 5 shows the serious violent crime rates for the Tranche 1 CDRPs combined as well as forecast rates that are predicted based on the observed crime rates *prior to the introduction of the TVCP*. In this case, observed crime rates fall below these forecast rates, suggesting a positive effect of the TVCP in these areas.

<sup>10</sup> It was not possible to test the robustness of these forecast using earlier data. This is because not enough data points were available, since only data from April 2002 could be employed. Therefore, these forecasts should be interpreted with caution.


**Figure 5: Serious violent crime rates per 1,000 population for Tranche 1 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 1 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in November 2004.**



Source: Home Office.


The same pattern can be observed in the case of less serious violent crime for the tranche 1 TVCP areas and sex offences for the two tranches (see Figures 6, 9-10). However, forecasts for tranche 2 TVCP areas did not predict an upward trend, and the observed rates were very close to the forecast, suggesting little or no effect of the TVCP on crime rates (see Figures 7-8).

**Figure 6: Less serious violent crime rates per 1,000 population for Tranche 1 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 1 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in November 2004.**




Source: Home Office.

**Figure 7: Serious violent crime rates per 1,000 population for Tranche 2 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 2 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in May 2005.**




Source: Home Office.

**Figure 8: Less serious violent crime rates per 1,000 population for Tranche 2 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 2 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in May 2005.**




Source: Home Office.

**Figure 9: Number of sex offences per 1,000 population for Tranche 1 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 1 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in November 2004.**



Source: Home Office.

**Figure 10: Number of sex offences per 1,000 population for Tranche 2 and comparison CDRPs, with forecast rates for Tranche 2 CDRPs following the introduction of the TVCP in May 2005.**



Source: Home Office.

The problem with this model is that *only data prior to the introduction to the TVCP are included*, which means that the forecast rates do not take into account any other changes that may have affected crime rates *following* the introduction of the TVCP. For instance, in the case of serious violent crime in tranche 1, projections based on crime rates prior to the introduction of the TVCP indicate crime should continue to rise. When these estimated rates are compared to the observed rates, the difference is notable. However, when the crime rates of the matched areas is examined, it becomes apparent that crime rates were also going down. Any reduction in crime in the TVCP areas thus cannot be solely attributed to the TVCP, since the non-TVCP areas exhibited quite similar trends.

In order to address this problem, a second set of time series ARIMA (1,1,0) models were carried out, this time following a two step process. Firstly, a regression analysis was performed on the crime rates of the TVCP areas, with the crime rates of the matched areas acting as a predictor. This analysis determines how much of the

TVCP crime can be predicted based on the crime in the matched areas. Whatever is left over (i.e. cannot be predicted on the basis on the matched areas' levels of crime) we refer to as *residuals*. In this way, the residuals represent the difference between the TVCP and the matched areas.

Once these residuals are calculated, a time series analysis can be performed which will determine whether the trend these residuals were following changed following the introduction of the TVCP. Ideally, we would expect the residuals to become higher following the introduction of the TVCP. This is because this would indicate that the levels of crime cannot be predicted solely based on the matched areas as well from this point. In other words, another variable (i.e. the introduction of the TVCP) will also become important in predicting the TVCP areas' levels of violent crime.

By following this procedure, the analysis controls for any variations in crime rates that are due to any other external factors, and that would affect *both the TVCP and the comparison areas*. These factors include AMECs and, in particular, the introduction of the Licensing Act 2003 in November 2005.

The analyses performed revealed that, in tranche 1, once the trends in the comparison CDRPs had been controlled for, no statistically significant effect on crime rates following the introduction of the TVCP could be identified, either for serious violence ( $B=.69$ ,  $\beta=.98$ ,  $t=.70$ ,  $p=.49$ ), less serious violence ( $B=-.13$ ,  $\beta=.86$ ,  $t=-.15$ ,  $p=.88$ ) or sex offences ( $B=-2.04$ ,  $\beta=1.04$ ,  $t=-1.97$ ,  $p=.06$ ). In the case of tranche 2, results were again non-significant (serious violence:  $B=1.17$ ,  $\beta=-.89$ ,  $t=1.32$ ,  $p=.19$ ; less serious violence  $B=.32$ ,  $\beta=.81$ ,  $t=.40$ ,  $p=.69$ ; sex offences:  $B=.60$ ,  $\beta=1.14$ ,  $t=.53$ ,  $p=.60$ ).

The possibility that any significant effects in individual areas and/or crime types were obscured through aggregation was explored by conducting a detailed examination of crime rates at the CDRP and crime type level. However, this examination dismissed this possibility (see Tables 6-7).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Please note that, although some significant results were obtained, this is no more than would have been expected by chance due to the number of tests performed.

**Table 6. Time series ARIMA (1,1,0) statistical results for the effect of the TVCP on crime rates by individual CDRP, for the number of serious, less serious violent crime and sex offences per 1,000 population.**

	Serious Violence				Less Serious violence				Sexual Violence				
	B	$\beta$	t	P	B	$\beta$	t	p	B	$\beta$	t	p	
TRANCHE 1	Brent	.95	1.12	.85	.40	-1.18	.85	-1.39	.17	.88	1.08	.81	.42
	Hackney	-2.16	1.05	-2.06	.04*	-.20	1.10	-.19	.85	-1.69	1.15	-1.47	.15
	Islington	-.01	1.02	-.01	.99	-.98	.90	-1.09	.28	-1.02	1.19	-.86	.40
	Lambeth	.15	1.03	.14	.89	-.47	.85	-.55	.58	-1.14	1.26	-.91	.37
	Southwark	1.09	.98	1.12	.27	1.32	1.19	1.10	.28	-.46	1.07	-.43	.67
	Westminster	-.26	.96	-.27	.79	2.29	1.04	2.19	.03*	-.01	.98	-.01	.99
	Bolton	-.05	.97	-.05	.96	.36	.88	.04	.69	-.86	1.04	-.83	.41
	Liverpool	.19	.67	.28	.78	-.52	.86	-.61	.55	1.03	1.11	.93	.36
	Wirral	-.80	1.03	-.77	.44	1.73	.87	2.00	.05	.22	1.10	.20	.85
	Cardiff	-1.11	.99	-1.12	.27	.15	.96	.16	.88	.01	.91	.01	.99
	Kingston Upon Hull	-.13	1.01	-.13	.89	.53	.88	.59	.56	-1.84	.81	-.26	.03*
	Wakefield	1.03	1.15	.90	.38	-1.05	.90	-1.17	.25	-2.28	.88	-2.57	.01*
TRANCHE 2	Nottingham	-.28	.98	-.29	.77	-.28	.98	-.29	.25	-.82	.87	-.94	.35
	Manchester	1.29	.89	1.45	.15	1.29	.89	1.45	.15	1.20	.98	1.23	.23
	Salford	-.37	1.01	-.37	.71	-.37	1.01	-.37	.71	.26	1.11	.23	.82
	Coventry	1.27	1.00	1.26	.21	1.27	1.00	1.26	.21	-.06	1.32	-.04	.97
	Wolverhampton	.16	1.17	.14	.89	.16	1.17	.14	.89	.58	1.06	.54	.59
	Rhonda Cynon Taff	-.08	1.18	-.07	.95	-.08	1.18	-.07	.95	-2.07	1.05	-1.97	.06
	Swansea	1.04	1.04	1.00	.32	1.04	1.04	1.00	.32	1.54	1.06	1.46	.15

N.B.: (\*) p&lt;.05.

**Table 7. Time series ARIMA (1,1,0) statistical results for the effect of the TVCP on crime rates per 1,000 population by crime type, for tranches 1 and 2.**

	Tranche 1				Tranche 2			
	B	$\beta$	t	p	B	$\beta$	t	p
Murder	.15	1.12	.14	.89	-.31	1.17	-.27	.79
Manslaughter	.10	1.00	.10	.92	-.58	1.12	-.52	.61
Attempted murder	-.82	.88	-.92	.36	-.61	1.12	.54	.59
Death by dangerous driving	-.73	1.22	-.60	.55	.33	1.19	.28	.78
Serious wounding	.80	.96	.84	.41	1.10	.87	1.26	.21
Racially aggravated wounding	.30	1.05	.29	.77	.06	1.21	.05	.96
Other wounding	-.87	.88	-.99	.33	.55	.81	.68	.50
Common assault	1.42	.73	1.96	.06	.13	.71	.18	.86
Racially aggravated common assault	-1.88	1.15	-1.64	.11	1.29	1.09	1.18	.25
Assault on a police officer	-.05	1.09	-.05	.96	-.84	.74	-1.14	.26
Harassment	.19	.97	.20	.84	-.92	1.13	-.82	.42
Racially aggravated harassment	1.46	.91	1.61	.11	.66	1.04	.63	.53
Disorder	-.95	.98	-.96	.34	-2.59	1.23	-2.10	.04*

N.B.: (\*)  $p < .05$ .

The time series analyses presented in this section suggest that existing upwards trends for serious, less serious, and sexual violence in tranche 1 TVCP areas appear to have been halted in the last two years. However, these reductions might be the result of a number of initiatives, rather than the TVCP alone.

As for tranche 2 TVCP areas, violent crime rates seem to have either decreased gradually over time (in the case of serious violence) or remained fairly stable (less serious and sexual violence), with estimated rates based pre-TVCP crime statistics staying close to the observed crime rates.

## APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (OPERATIONAL)

### For Single Point of Contact Staff

#### Context

- 1) Area size and make up i.e. urban v. rural areas, industrial v. commercial
- 2) Population size and make up i.e. ethnicity, age
- 3) Specific violent crime problems
  - a. What was the nature of the problem/s you wished to target?
  - b. When, and in what context did the problems develop in the first instance.
  - c. How had you dealt with the problem prior to TVCP

#### Project Specifics

- 1) Explain your TVCP. What was the aim?
- 2) What was the rationale behind your TVCP project/s – how was the need identified?
- 3) How were the projects intended to have their effect?
- 4) Please give dates and of all TVCP related projects run during the time they have been involved in TVCP.
- 5) Did the project achieve what it set out to do? – Reasons why the projects succeeded or failed. i.e. what has/has not worked and why?
- 6) Has there been any evaluation of the project/s and its outcome/s?
- 7) Were there any other interventions or initiatives (focused at the night time economy) happening at the same time as TVCP? If so what were they and when did they occur? (want to try and exclude these from the project)
- 8) To whom and how have you disseminated the results of your projects?
- 9) Any particular 'nuggets of gold' we can learn from your experience – what are you really proud of?

#### Best Bar None

- 1) Have you started the 'Best Bar none' or similar programme in your CDRP? If not, why?
- 2) When did you implement the programme?
- 3) Have you specifically tailored the programme to your CDRPs needs at all? If so how?
- 4) Do you believe it is having any impact on violent crime in your CDRP/CSP?

#### Partnership Working

- 1) Which partners are in your CDRP/CSP?
- 2) What other partners did you work with (other than CDRP/CSP) during your TVCP projects?
- 3) Did the partnership work as planned? Why/why not? What facilitated/hindered it?
- 4) Did you find working with these groups a positive or negative experience? In which ways?
- 5) Do you think you have gained any long-term benefits (or otherwise) out of partnership working on the TVCP projects?

#### Does it work?

- 1) Have you had any difficulties with the TVCP? If so, please explain.
- 2) Are there any parts of the TVCP which you think need to be improved?
- 3) What parts of the TVCP have been the most simple to implement? Explain.
- 4) What parts of the TVCP do you think work well and need to be emulated?
- 5) Would you recommend TVCP to other CDRPs or forces?

Last thoughts

- 1) Do you feel you received sufficient support during this project? Who from?
- 2) Is there anyone else who would be good to talk to regarding the project/s?
- 3) Do you have any other comments you would like to add?

## APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (STRATEGIC)

### For Field Officers in the first instance and/or Force Leads/Government Office Leads

#### Context

- 1) Which CDRPs do you lead on?
- 2) Which tranches have you been involved in?
- 3) How long have you been involved in the TVCP? i.e. from the beginning or only more recently.
- 4) Please explain your role within the TVCP – what are you responsible for? Both in terms of the CDRP and the Home Office.

#### Start up and Support

- 6) Have you had any difficulties starting up the TVCP within your CDRPs? If so, please explain. How did you overcome these problems?
- 7) Have you had any ongoing problems with any CDRPs in terms of the TVCP? If so, please explain. How did you overcome these problems?
- 8) How much flexibility do you have in the TVCP in terms of PSU having strategic control of the programme, but CDRPs having operational control of their area? How well does this work in practise? Is their potentially a better model?
- 9) Do you feel your CDRPs received sufficient support during the TVCP from the PSU?
- 10) Do you feel your CDRPs were supportive of the TVCP in general?
- 11) How well do you feel the 'Best Bar None' programme has taken off in your CDRPs? Where there any specific problems you can think of?

#### Finances

- 1) How much funding have your CDRPs applied for (on average)?
- 2) Do they typically use all the funds given to them?
- 3) Do you feel that the funds are used in the best way in order to get the maximum result?
- 4) Do you feel that there is enough accountability in the use of the funds?

#### Dissemination

- 1) Do you feel that the lessons learned from TVCP have been well disseminated among:
  - a. the public within TVCP areas
  - b. partners involved in the TVCP
  - c. Police Force Areas **not** involved with TVCP
  - d. other TVCP groups across the country
  - e. nationally

#### Partnership Working

- 1) Did your CDRPs work with other partners on TVCP projects?

## If 'YES'

- 2) Which agencies were involved in these partnerships?
- 3) What was the rationale behind the involvement with these agencies?
- 4) Did all of the agencies approached choose to get involved, and if 'not' do you know why?
- 5) What level of involvement did the partners have? i.e. were they fully involved or more for 'show'.
- 6) Did the resulting partnerships work as planned? Why/why not?
- 7) What or who do you believe both facilitated and hindered aspects of the partnership working?
- 8) Were there any particular 'sore issues' within partnerships such as funding or time schedules? Please explain.
- 9) How were these 'sore issues' overcome?
- 10) In hindsight do you believe there is anything else the CDRPs could have done to get more value out of their partnerships?
- 11) What benefits have you seen stem from these partnerships - both within TVCP and outside TVCP?
- 12) Are there any 'good practise' issues that stem from your CDRPs (in terms of working in partnerships) which you would like to share?

## If 'NO'

- 2) Was there any attempt to involve partners in any part of the project? Including planning, operational, and results phases.
- 3) What was the rationale for not involving partners?
- 4) Do you think the projects/s suffered as a result of the lack of partnership?
- 5) Do you think this/these CDRP/s need to be more active in establishing partnerships?
- 6) What do you think could be done to encourage partnership in this/these CDRP/s?

Last Thoughts

- 1) Overall, do you feel that TVCP works? Why/Why not? Do you have any other comments you would like to add?